




Collecting Information to improve Decision-Making
Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H.; Timmer, J.B.
Publication date:
2000
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Brânzei, R., Tijs, S. H., & Timmer, J. B. (2000). Collecting Information to improve Decision-Making. (CentER
Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-26). Microeconomics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





COLLECTING INFORMATION TO IMPROVE
DECISION-MAKING





Rodica Brânzei1, Stef Tijs2 and Judith Timmer3
Abstract
In this paper we consider information collecting (IC) situations where
an action taker in an uncertain situation can improve his action choices
by gathering information from some players who are more informed about
the situation. Then the problem of sharing the gains when cooperating
with informants is tackled by constructing an appropriate game, the IC–
game corresponding to the IC–situation. It turns out that the cone of IC–
games, given a fixed set of players, coincides with the cone of 0–normalized
monotonic games with a veto player. Also special classes of convex IC–
games and big boss IC–games are considered, for which more is known
about the solution concepts.
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1 Introduction
This paper concentrates on cooperative decision-making under uncertainty. It deals
with collecting information to improve decision-making. To be more detailed, an
action taker has incomplete information about relevant facts to act optimally and
he can obtain more information from other agents who are more informed about
the situation.
One can think for example of collecting information about the intensity of
a happening such that a provider of goods for the visitors of the happening can
act better. Another example is about a hidden object that can be detected more
adequately if one collects some information. Interesting questions that arise are:
from whom to obtain information, what to pay for it? We construct a model
of information collecting situations (IC–situation) and assign to such a situation
a cooperative game (the IC–game) to handle the question of the transfers of
payoffs to the informants. Such an IC–situation is a hybrid of a one-person
decision problem under uncertainty and an Aumann structure, which describes the
knowledge of the informants. The corresponding IC–game offers the possibility
to consider compensations for informed agents that correspond to the various
solution concepts developed in this field of cooperative game theory.
In this context we like to mention the paper of Slikker et al. (1999) on
information sharing games, which is in the same spirit as this paper. In the Slikker
et al. paper, however, all players are action takers. The corresponding information
sharing games exhaust the cone of games with a population monotonic allocation
scheme.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we formally introduce
IC–situations and IC–games. We give three examples dealing with information
collecting situations in uncertain environments. The first example deals with a
search problem, the second with the problem of participating in a gamble or not,
and the third with the problem of preparing the right amount of goods for a sales
outlet. In section 3 we show that the IC–games (with a fixed action taker and a
fixed set of informants) form a convex cone in the game space that coincides with
the cone of 0–normalized monotonic games with a fixed veto player. In the last
section, section 4, we discuss some solutions for IC–games and also for subclasses
of IC–games that are convex games or big boss games. Some special results are
derived for 3-person IC–games.
2
2 Information collecting situations
and IC–games
The information collecting situation (IC–situation) to be introduced is a hybrid of
a one-person decision situation under uncertainty and an Aumann structure.
Here we mean with a one-person decision situation under uncertainty a tuple
<{0}, (Ω,F , µ), A, {ra : Ω −→ IR | a ∈ A}>,
where agent 0 is the decision-maker (action taker) who has to choose an action a
from the action set A. The set of possible states (relevant to the decision situation)
is denoted by Ω and the probability measure µ, which is defined on the σ-algebra
F of subsets of Ω, describes the prior belief of agent 0 over all the states ω in
Ω. Elements of the σ-algebra F will be called events. Agent 0 receives the
reward ra(ω) if he chooses action a and when ω turns out to be the true state.
In the following the reward function ra : Ω −→ IR is supposed to be a bounded
F–measurable function and we also suppose that agent 0 is risk-neutral.
An Aumann structure (cf. R.J. Aumann (1976), R. Fagin et al. (1999) p. 332)
is a tuple
<{1, 2, ..., n}, (Ω,F , µ), (Ii)i∈N>
where (Ω,F , µ) is a probability space as above, N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a set of
partially informed agents about the state ω ∈ Ω at hand, and the information of
each i ∈ N is described by a finite F–measurable partition Ii of Ω. If ω ∈ Ω is
the true state, then agent i knows that the event Ii(ω) happens, where Ii(ω) is that
element (atom) of the partition Ii of Ω that contains ω.
An IC–situation is now defined as a tuple
<N, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii | i ∈ N}, A, {ra : Ω −→ IR | a ∈ A}>
where N = {0} ∪ N = {0, 1, 2, ..., n}, and where the other components are as
above.
An IC–situation models an interactive situation, where the action taker 0 has
to choose an action a, and where his resulting reward ra(ω) depends on the state
ω ∈ Ω. Without cooperating with players in N he only knows the probability
measure µ, describing the probability of events E ∈ F . But the optimal expected
reward can be improved upon by using the partial knowledge of agents in N ,
because these agents have information on the state, described by their information
partitions, which is available before player 0 has to choose an action.
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Let us be more precise about these expected rewards. Agent 0 can obtain on






Together with the coalition S ⊂ N the expected reward is given by








where IS is the coursest partition of Ω that is a refinement of Ii for each i ∈ S.
This is called the join of {Ii | i ∈ S}. Then I ⊂ Ω is an atom of IS if and only if
I is a non-empty intersection of atoms {Ii | i ∈ S}, that is,
I = ∩i∈SIi 6= ∅, with Ii ∈ Ii.
Note that if the state ω happens, the event I = ∩i∈SIi(ω) is known by 0 before
taking an action in case he collects information from all members of S.
If 0 works together with all players in N to improve his action choice,
then the question arises how to compensate (pay) the informed players for their
help. In this paper we contribute to this question by constructing a cooperative
TU–game <N, v> related to the IC–situation. This opens the possibility to
consider compensation schemes which correspond to the various solution concepts
developed in the field of cooperative game theory.
For the game<N, v> the player setN = {0, 1, 2, ..., n} and the characteristic
function v : 2N −→ IR is defined as follows:
(a) v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N with 0 /∈ S,
(b) v(S) = w(S)− w(0) for all S with 0 ∈ S.
Formula (a) expresses the fact that no reward improvements by cooperation can
be made if the action taker 0 is not in the coalition. Formula (b) expresses that
the worth v(S) of coalition S is the improvement in expected reward made by not
standing alone but collecting the information of all members in S \ {0} before
taking an (optimal) action.
We will call this game<N, v> the IC–game corresponding to the underlying
IC–situation. Properties of IC–games and solutions will be studied later. Now we
will give three examples to illustrate the notions. The examples give indications
to possible applications.
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Example 1. (Catch the monster)
Consider the IC–situation
<N, (Ω,F , µ), {Ii | i ∈ N}, A, {ra : Ω→ IR | a ∈ A}>
whereN = {0, 1, 2}, Ω = [0, 1], F is the family of Borel subsets of [0, 1] and µ is
the Lebesgue measure. Furthermore,
I1 = {[0, 1/3) , [1/3, 1]} ,
I2 = {[0, 2/3] , (2/3, 1]} ,
A = [0, 1] and ra(x) = −36|x− a| for all x, a ∈ [0, 1].
One can think of a situation where a (0–dimensional) monster is hidden in one
of the points x of the closed interval [0, 1] and player 0 has to catch the monster
operating from a suitable basis a ∈ [0, 1]. The cost of catching the monster is a
multiple (36) of the distance between the operating basis a of player 0 and the
hiding place x of the monster. In choosing a good basis, player 0 can use the help
of player 1 who knows whether the monster is to the left of 1/3 or not and of
player 2, who knows whether the monster is to the right of 2/3 or not.
































∣∣∣∣dx = −1− 4 = −5
(Basis in 1/6 if x ∈ [0, 1/3) and basis in 2/3 if x ∈ [1/3, 1] .) Similarly,
w({0, 2}) = −5. Furthermore, I{1,2} = {[0, 1/3) , [1/3, 2/3] , (2/3, 1]} and
w({0, 1, 2}) = −3.So, we havev(∅) = v({0}) = v({1}) = v({2}) = v({1, 2}) =
0, v({0, 1}) = v({0, 2}) = 4 and v({0, 1, 2}) = 6.
Example 2. (Gamble or not)
Consider the information collecting situation with N = {0, 1, 2}, Ω =
= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, µ(ω) = 1/6 for each ω ∈ Ω, I1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}, I2 =
5
= {{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 6}}, A = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, n}, rn(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and for
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6} we have rk(ω) = 60 if k = ω and rk(ω) = −18 otherwise.
One can think of a situation where a fair die is thrown. Player 0 has the
possibility to guess the outcome (actions 1, 2, ..., 6) or not to participate in the
game (action n, payoff 0). A correct guess gives a reward of 60, a wrong guess a
cost of 18. Without extra information this is not an attractive gamble for player 0.
There are however two possible informants, the players 1 and 2. Player 1 knows
whether the outcome of the die is low or high, and player 2 knows whether the
outcome is odd or even.
The corresponding information collecting game is given by v(∅) = v({0}) =
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({1, 2}) = 0, v({0, 1}) = v({0, 2}) = 8 and v({0, 1, 2}) =
34. Note that I{1,2} = {{1, 3}, {4, 6}, {2}, {5}}. Thus the latter value is obtained
as follow.




















(r1(1) + r1(3) + r4(4) + r4(6) + r2(2) + r5(5)) = 34.
Example 3. (The right amount of ice-cream)
Consider the information collecting situation with N = {0, 1}, Ω = {n, h},
µ(n) = 0.8, µ(h) = 0.2, I1 ={{n}, {h}}, A={s, `}, and rs(n) = 50, rs(h) = 60,
r`(n) = 30, r`(h) = 100.
One can think of an ice-cream seller who always sells ice-cream at a sales
outlet far away from his house. He distinguishes two posible situations: the normal
situation (n) (prior probability 0.8) and the situation where there is a higher activity
(h). He can make a phone call to player 1 before leaving home and ask him about
the state. Depending on this he takes either a small (s) or a large (`) amount of
ice-cream with him to the sales outlet.
To calculate the corresponding IC–game<{0, 1}, v>, note that
(i) w(0)=max{0.8rs(n)+0.2rs(h), 0.8r`(n)+0.2r`(h)}=max{52, 44}=52.
(Without extra information it is optimal to take a small amount of ice-cream
to the selling place.)
(ii) w(0, 1)=0.8 max{rs(n), r`(n)}+0.2 max{rs(h), r`(h)}=40+20=60.
(With information, player 0 takes a small amount if ω = n and a large
amount otherwise.)
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So, v({0, 1}) = 8 and v({0}) = v({1}) = 0.
3 IC–games and monotonic games
with one veto player
A game <N, v> with player set N = {0, 1, 2, ..., n} is called a game with 0 as
veto player if
(V0) v(S) = 0 for each S ⊂ N \ {0},
it is monotonic if
(M) v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S, T with S ⊂ T ⊆ N,
and it is called zero-normalized if v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N . From now on we
denote the cone of zero-normalized games satisfying (V0) and (M) by MV0(N)
and ICG(N) is the family of IC–games with player set N .
The following two propositions tell that the IC–games with player set N
form a subcone of MV0(N). The main result of this section, theorem 3.5, shows
that in fact these cones coincide.
Proposition 3.1. Let v ∈ ICG(N) where N = {0, 1, 2, ..., n}. Then v ∈
MV0(N).
Proof. (i) By definition, v(S) = 0 if 0 /∈ S and v({0}) = 0, so v satisfies (V0).
This implies that v is a zero-normalized game.
(ii) To prove (M), take S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T. Note that in case 0 /∈ S we
have v(S) = 0 ≤ v(T ). In case 0 ∈ S ⊂ T the inequality v(S) ≤ v(T ) follows
from the fact that the partition IT \{0} is a refinement of the partition IS\{0}:




































ra(ω)dµ(ω) = v(T ) + w(0),
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Proposition 3.2. ICG(N) is a convex cone of games.
Proof. Let α, α′ ∈ IR+ and let v, v′ ∈ ICG(N). Let
<N, (Ω,F , µ), (Ii)i∈N , A, {ra : Ω −→ IR | a ∈ A}>
be an IC–situation leading to the IC–game <N, v> and let the IC–situation
<N, (Ω′,F ′, µ′), (I ′i)i∈N , A
′,{ra′|a′∈A′}> generate the game <N, v′>. Then
C =<N, (Ω×Ω′,F × F ′, µ× µ′),
(Ii × I
′
i)i∈N , A× A
′, {r(a,a′) | (a, a
′) ∈ A× A′}>
is an IC–situation where µ×µ′ is the product probability measure on the product
σ–algebraF×F ′, Ii×I ′i is the partition of Ω×Ω
′with atomsE×E′whereE ∈ Ii,
E′ ∈ I ′i and r(a,a′) : Ω×Ω
′ −→ IR is defined by r(a,a′)(ω, ω′) = αra(ω)+α′ra′(ω′)
for all (a, a′) ∈ A × A′ and (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω× Ω′. Corresponding to this situation is
the IC–game <N, vC> = <N,αv+α′v′>, To prove that vC = αv + α′v′, note


















= αw(0) + α′w′(0).
































= α(v(S) + w(0)) + α′(v′(S) + w′(0)).
Hence, vC = αv + α′v′.
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The next proposition shows that the cone MV0(N) can be generated by
taking non-negative combinations of simple games in MV0(N), which are games
<N, v> where v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S and v(N) = 1.
Proposition 3.3. For each v ∈MV0(N), v 6= 0, there are k ∈ N , α1, α2, ..., αk >





Proof. Take v 6= 0 in MV0(N). Let β0, β1, ..., βk be the worths of the different
coalitions of v such that 0 = β0 < β1 < · · · < βk = v(N). For each r ∈
{1, 2, ..., k} define the simple game wr by
wr(S) =
{
1 if v(S) ≥ αr
0 otherwise
for each S ∈ 2N .
Then v ∈ MV0(N) implies that wr ∈ MV0(N). Define αr := βr − βr−1, then it
follows from the definition of wr that v =
∑k
r=1 αrwr.
We continue by showing that each simple game in MV0(N) is an IC–game.
Proposition 3.4. Let <N, u> be a simple zero–normalized monotonic game with
0 as veto player. Then there is an IC–situation C with corresponding IC–game
<N, v> such that u = v.
Proof. Let W := {S ⊂ N | u(S) = 1, u(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S, T 6= S}
be the set of minimum winning coalitions of the simple game <N, u>. Let




|E| for each E ⊂ Ω and Ii = {{ω ∈ Ω | ωi = 0}, {ω ∈ Ω | ωi = 1}}.
Let A = {a0} ∪ {a(S, I) | S ∈ W, I ∈ IS}. The rewards are ra0(ω) = 0 for all
ω ∈ Ω and
ra(S,I)(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ I
−2n otherwise
for all S ∈ W, I ∈ IS .
(Note that the action a(S, I) is only interesting in comparison to a0, if I is known.)
Now we prove that u = v, where v is the IC–game corresponding to C .
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ra(S,I)(ω)dµ(ω) ≤ 0 for all (S, I) ∈ W×IS. So for all S ⊂ N withS 6= ∅
we have








To prove that u(S ∪ {0}) = v(S ∪ {0}) for all non empty S ⊂ N , we consider
two cases.
Case 1. S ∪ {0} contains a minimum winning coalition T ∈ W. In this case
u(S ∪ {0}) = 1 by the monotonicity of u. We also have v(S ∪ {0}) ≤ 1 because
ra(ω) ≤ 1 for all a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω. On the other hand

































So v(S ∪ {0}) = 1 = u(S ∪ {0}).
Case 2. S ∪ {0} does not contain any minimum winning coalition of <N, u>.
Then u(S ∪ {0}) = 0. Further v(S ∪ {0}) ≥
∫
Ω
ra0(ω)dµ(ω) = 0. To prove that
v(S ∪ {0}) = 0 it is sufficient to show that for each T ∈ W, I ∈ IT and each

















ra(T,I)dµ(ω) ≤ 0 if |K \ I | ≥ 1. We prove that K \ I 6= ∅ by observing that
K is of the form
{x ∈ Ω | xi = αi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ S},
and that I is of the form {x ∈ Ω | xi = βi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ T}. Since S does
not contain any minimum winning coalition we have that T \S 6= ∅. Let x̂ ∈ Ω be
such that x̂i = αi for all i ∈ S, and x̂i = 1− βi for all i ∈ T \S. Then x̂ ∈ K \ I,
which finishes the proof.
The theorem below formulates the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.5. MV0(N) = ICG(N).
Proof. From Proposition 3.1 it follows that ICG(N) ⊂ MV0(N). From Propo-
sition 3.4 it follows that all zero–normalized simple monotonic games with 0 as
veto player are elements of ICG(N). Since ICG(N) is a cone by Proposition
3.2, and each element of ICG(N) is a non–negative linear combination of zero–
normalized simple monotonic games with 0 as veto player (Proposition 3.3), we
conclude that also the reverse inclusion MV0(N) ⊂ ICG(N) holds.
4 Solutions for IC–games
This last section contains many unexplained notions of cooperative game theory.
For details we refer to the mentioned papers and to the books of Curiel (1997) and
Driessen (1988).
The fact that an IC–game <N, v> is monotonic and that 0 is a veto player
implies that the vector (v(N), 0, 0, ..., 0) is a core element, which gives all the
gains obtained by cooperation to the action taker. So the core C(v) is nonempty.
We note that this core element coincides with n! marginal vectors namely with
those for which the entry order is such that 0 enters last. So the IC–game<N, v>
is a permutationally convex game (cf. Granot and Huberman (1982)). Note that
the given core element can also be extended to a population monotonic allocation
scheme (cf. Sprumont (1990))
[aS,i]S∈2N\{∅},i∈S, where aS,i =
{
v(S) if i = 0 ∈ S
0 otherwise.
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From the paper of Arin and Feltkamp (1997), which deals with the class of
veto rich games containing the class MV0(N) = ICG(N), we can conclude that
the bargaining set (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1964)) of an IC–game coincides
with the core. Also, the kernel (cf. Davis and Maschler (1965)) contains only one
element, namely the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)) and there is an efficient
algorithm to calculate this value. Because IC–games are zero–monotonic the
prekernel and the kernel coincide and the nucleolus is equal to the prenucleolus
(cf. Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972)).
More about solutions can be said for games in two interesting subclasses of
MV0(N) = ICG(N) namely UMV0(N) and CMV0(N), which we introduce
now.
UMV0(N) is the cone of those games v ∈MV0(N) that satisfy the so-called
union property:
(U) v(N)− v(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
Mi(v) for all S ⊂ N with 0 ∈ S
whereMi(v) = v(N)−v(N \{i}). This classUMV0(N) is the class of monotonic
big boss games and is well-studied (cf. Muto et al. (1988), Tijs (1990)). If
v ∈ UMV0(N), then
(i) the core C(v) is equal to the parallelepiped{
x ∈ IRN






(ii) the τ -value (cf. Tijs (1981)) and the nucleolus coincide and are equal to the


















CMV0(N) is the cone of those games inMV0(N) that are convex (cf. Shapley
(1971)), that is, for which the property (C) holds:
(C) v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) for all S, T ⊂ N and i ∈ N with
S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}.
Games with property (C) have many other nice properties. We mention only that
for a game v ∈ CMV0(N), the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)) Φ(v) is a core
element and that the core is the convex hull of the (n+ 1)! marginal vectors.
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Let us again look at the three examples in section 2. Example 1 (catch the
monster) resulted in the IC–game with v({0, 1}) = v({0, 2}) = 4, v({0, 1, 2}) =
6, and v(S) = 0 for all other coalitions S. Since M1(v) +M2(v) = 2 + 2 < 6 =
v(N)− v(0), v ∈ UMV0(N). The core is{
x ∈ IR{0,1,2} | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 2, x0 = 6− x1 − x2
}
and the τ–value and the nucleolus are equal to (4, 1, 1). The Shapley value is
the average of the marginal vectors: (0, 4, 2), (0, 2, 4), (4, 0, 2), (6, 0, 0), (4, 2, 0),
(6, 0, 0) and equals (11/3, 4/3, 4/3) . Note that the last four marginal vectors are
extreme points of the core. The marginal vectors (0, 4, 2) and (0, 2, 4), corre-
sponding to entry orders where 0 enters first, are no core elements.
Example 2 (gamble or not) resulted in the IC–game with v({0, 1}) =
v({0, 2}) = 8, v({0, 1, 2}) = 34 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. This game v is
convex, so v ∈ CMV0(N). The core equals
conv{(0, 8, 26), (0, 26, 8), (8, 0, 26), (34, 0, 0), (8, 26, 0), (34, 0, 0)}
where conv stands for convex hull, and the Shapley value is Φ(v) = (14, 10, 10) ∈
C(v).
Example 3 (the right amount of ice cream) resulted in a 2–person game which
has the properties (U) and (C). Note that for all 2–person IC–games we have
MV0({0, 1}) = CMV0({0, 1}) = UMV0({0, 1}).
The next proposition tells that each 3-person IC–game has at least one of the
properties (U) and (C). This is not necessarily the case for n–person IC–games
with n ≥ 4, as the final example 4 shows.
Proposition 4.1. MV0({0, 1, 2}) = CMV0({0, 1, 2}) ∪ UMV0({0, 1, 2}).
Proof. Clearly, the set on the right sight of the equality sign is included in
MV0({0, 1, 2}). For the converse inclusion, take v ∈ MV0({0, 1, 2}). Then it is
sufficient to show that the following two claims hold.
(C.1) v ∈ UMV0({0, 1, 2}) iff v({0, 1, 2} − v({0}) ≥M1(v) +M2(v)
(C.2) v ∈ CMV0({0, 1, 2}) iff v({0, 1, 2} − v({0}) ≤M1(v) +M2(v).
(C.1) is obvious. To prove (C.2) note first that for all v ∈ MV0({0, 1, 2}) we
have by monotonicity that v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) holds if
{0} 6= S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i}. Then v ∈ CMV0({0, 1, 2})
13
⇐⇒ v({0, i}) − v({0}) ≤ v({0, 1, 2}) − v({0, j}) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
⇐⇒ v({0, 1, 2})− v({0}) ≤M1(v) +M2(v).
Example 4. Let <N, v> be given by N = {0, 1, 2, 3}, v(S) = 2 if |S| = 2 and
0 ∈ S, v(S) = 3 if |S| = 3 and 0 ∈ S, v(N) = 5, and v(S) = 0 in all other cases.
Then v ∈MV0(N), v does not satisfy (U) because




and v does not satisfy (C) because
v({0, 1})− v({0}) = 2 > 1 = v({0, 1, 2, 3})− v({0, 2}).
References
[1] Arin, J., Feltkamp, V. (1997), The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transfe-
rable utility games. International Journal of Game Theory 26: 61–73.
[2] Aumann, R.J., Maschler, M. (1964), The bargaining set for cooperative
games. Annals of Mathematics Studies 52: 443–476.
[3] Aumann, R.J. (1999), Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge. International
Journal of Game Theory 28: 263–300.
[4] Curiel, I. (1997), Cooperative Game Theory and Applications. Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, Boston.
[5] Davis, M., Maschler, M. (1965), The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly 12: 223–259.
[6] Driessen, T.S.H. (1988), Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
[7] Fagin, R., Geanakoplos, J., Halpern, J.Y., Vardi, M.Y. (1999), The hierarchi-
cal approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge. International
Journal of Game Theory 26: 331–365.
[8] Gillies, D.B. (1953), Some Theorems on n–Person Games, Ph.D. thesis,
Princeton, New Jersey.
14
[9] Granot, D., Huberman, G. (1982), The relation between convex games and
minimum cost spanning tree games: A case for permutationally convex
games. SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods 3: 228–292.
[10] Maschler, M., Peleg, B., Shapley, L.S. (1972), The kernel and bargaining set
for convex games. International Journal of Game Theory 1: 73–93.
[11] Muto, S., Nakayama, M., Potters, J., Tijs, S. (1988), On big boss games. The
Economic Studies Quarterly 39: 303–321.
[12] Schmeidler, D. (1969), The nucleolus of a characteristic game. SIAM Journal
on Applied Mathematics 17: 1163–1170.
[13] Shapley, LS. (1953), A value for n–person games. Annals of Mathematical
Studies 28: 307–317.
[14] Shapley, LS. (1971), Cores of convex games. International Journal of Game
Theory 1: 11–26.
[15] Slikker, M., Norde, H., Tijs, S. (1999), Information sharing games. working
paper, Tilburg University (forthcoming).
[16] Sprumont, Y. (1990), Population monotonic allocation schemes for coop-
erative games with transferable utility. Games and Economic Behavior 2:
378–394.
[17] Tijs, S.H. (1981), Bounds for the core and the τ–value. In: O. Moeschlin and
D. Pallaschke eds., Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam:
North Holland.
[18] Tijs, S.H. (1990), Big boss games, clan games and information market
games. In: Game Theory and Applications (Eds. T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman and
Y. Tauman), Academic Press, Inc., San Diego, 1990.
15
